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Integrating Philosophy of Science  
Into Research on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in the Life Sciences 
Abstract 
This paper argues that research on normative issues in the life sciences will 
benefit from a tighter integration of philosophy of science. We examine research on 
ethical, legal and social issues in the life sciences (“ELSI”) and discuss three illustrative 
examples of normative issues that arise in different areas of the life sciences. These 
examples show that important normative questions are highly dependent on epistemic 
issues which so far have not been addressed sufficiently in ELSI, RRI and related areas 
of research. Accordingly, we argue for the integration of research on the epistemic 
aspects of the relevant areas of science into ELSI research to provide a better basis for 
addressing normative questions. 
1. Introduction
Research on normative questions in the life sciences is conducted in a variety of fields, 
in particular in Ethical, Legal and Social Issues (ELSI)1 research and bioethics / 
biomedical ethics, but also in fields more focused on regulatory aspects and questions of 
governance, such as Technology Assessment (TA) and Responsible Research and 
1 The original meaning of “ELSI” was Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications. The 
acronym “ELSA” (Ethical, Legal, and Social Aspects) is mainly used in European 
contexts and is meant to convey a somewhat broader meaning of the concept, 
highlighting the possibility to shape life science research and technology development 
instead of focusing only on downstream implications. Our use of “Issues” is meant to 
capture all of these different meanings. 
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Innovation (RRI). These fields share a number of characteristics, such as their 
interdisciplinary nature and their aim of providing answers to concrete normative 
problems that arise due to new developments in the life sciences. Important differences 
between them pertain to the kinds of questions that are in focus and the connections that 
are made to other academic fields of work. While for example biomedical ethics is 
closely connected to medical practice, biomedical basic research and philosophical 
ethics, ELSI connects more broadly to various fields of the life sciences as well as 
social science and legal studies. In all cases, though, there often is a lack of connection 
to current research in the philosophy of science. Accordingly, in this paper we want to 
show how research in the aforementioned fields could benefit from a tighter integration 
of philosophy of science into their work to better solve existing – and tackle new – 
normative questions in the life sciences. We will develop our argument by focusing 
specifically on the field of ELSI research, but we suggest that our findings can be 
generalized to bio(medical) ethics, TA and RRI. 
Recently, a few authors have made suggestions along similar lines, and we think 
of our paper as providing a case-based argumentation in the spirit of their work. Tuana 
(2013), for example, argued that the humanities often are underappreciated at 
institutional levels when it comes to the funding of interdisciplinary projects (see also 
Tuana 2010). Giving the humanities a more prominent place in what Tuana called 
“coupled ethical-epistemological research” will result both in better science (in the 
sense of better knowledge production) and in science that is more beneficial to society, 
Tuana argued. Tuana developed the idea of coupled ethical-epistemological research by 
examining research on climate change and geoengineering (Tuana 2013; Tuana et al. 
2012), while Katikireddi & Valles (2015) developed it in relation to public health 
research and Valles, Piso & O’Rourke (2019) applied it to two cases from 
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environmental science. In a similar vein, Oftedal (2014) recently argued for the 
integration of philosophy of science into the framework of RRI. Although Oftedal 
shares the underlying claim that philosophy of science can contribute to addressing 
normative concerns in life science research, her focus ultimately lies more on the 
governance aspects of RRI, such as questions of transparency and research funding, 
than on the role of philosophy of science. She maintains that the addition of philosophy 
of science “comes into view more easily” (Oftedal 2014, p.2) for RRI than for ELSI 
approaches and that philosophy of science “may be of more general relevance than of 
direct relevance to specific projects” (Oftedal 2014, p.10). In contrast, our paper 
attempts to provide illustrative examples for precisely the latter kind of relevance, in 
this sense complementing Oftedal’s arguments. 
The normative investigation of controversial areas of the life sciences and new 
biotechnologies, such as stem cells research, reproductive medicine, biobanking and 
genome editing, must involve the interdisciplinary study of the relevant scientific 
practices and the features of the technology in focus. Due to the interdisciplinary nature 
of their subject matter, bioethics and biomedical ethics have evolved into endeavors in 
which several disciplines join forces, most prominently under the heading of ELSI 
research. ELSI research in the life sciences is a thriving, inter- or multidisciplinary field 
of research, populated by scholars with backgrounds in, among others, ethics, theology, 
law, biomedicine and the social sciences. ELSI researchers aim at working in close 
contact with life scientists and biotechnology developers, sometimes even as an integral 
part of scientific or engineering projects. The aims of such close connections with 
scientific and technological practice are to (a) allow for the early detection of ethically 
relevant issues in scientific practice, (b) lay the groundwork for future regulation of 
emerging biotechnologies and cutting-edge scientific research (“anticipatory 
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governance”), and (c) promote public trust in innovative life science research and 
related biotechnologies. In addition, ELSI research is believed to raise the level of 
normative awareness and reflection regarding societal concerns amongst life scientists 
(Zwart and Nelis 2009; Zwart, Landeweerd, and van Rooij 2014a). 
Aiming for a similar integration of disciplines, the EU recently introduced 
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a framework intended to supersede 
traditional ELSI research (Owen et al., 2012; von Schomberg, 2013). On the one hand, 
RRI has been described as ELSI research “with a new livery” (Zwart, Landeweerd, and 
van Rooij 2014b). On the other hand, however, RRI has been described as grounded on 
issues of participatory governance and working with a stronger focus on economic 
valorization than most contemporary ELSI approaches (Bogner and Torgersen 2018; 
Burget, Bardone, and Pedaste 2017; Oftedal 2014). While this further development 
introduced new approaches into the study of societal aspects of research in the life 
sciences, so far it has not led to a systematic integration of another important discipline 
into ELSI research, namely the philosophy of science.  
In this paper we want to show the need for such a systematic integration by 
arguing for the following three claims: 
(1)  A number of important normative questions that are relevant for life science 
research and the development and application of new biotechnologies do not 
only have ethical, legal (including governance) and social aspects, but are highly 
dependent on epistemic issues (or have an epistemic dimension that connects 
them to metaphysical/ontological and historical issues regarding the life 
sciences). 
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(2)  These issues have often not been addressed sufficiently in ELSI, RRI and 
related research, as most such research is too disconnected from the field in 
which such issues are addressed (namely, the philosophy of science). 
(3)  One way to remedy this situation is a tighter integration of philosophy of 
science into the existing modes of research, such as ELSI, RRI, etc. 
That is, we argue that a concise investigation of the ethical, legal, and social issues 
raised by advances in the life sciences and in biotechnology would benefit from taking 
on board the results from the philosophical analysis of the knowledge that is produced 
in this area. It should, among other things, involve the assessment of how well founded 
and robust the knowledge is on which new applications are founded as well as the 
critical examination of knowledge production activities. 
For the purposes of this paper we employ a broad notion of philosophy of 
science which extends to all issues related to scientific knowledge and the practices of 
its production. Besides traditional epistemological considerations this also comprises 
the metaphysics of science (which for instance prominently features in discussions on 
scientific classifications), methodological issues, and close studies of scientific practice. 
Also, we will take it to include the integrated study of the history and the philosophy of 
science (“&HPS”),2 which highlights the philosophical importance of the historical 
aspects of scientific concepts and epistemic practices, and is one of the mainstream 
methodological approaches to the post-Kuhnian study of the epistemic dimension of the 
sciences, in particular of the natural and the life sciences.3 
                                               
2 See http://integratedhps.org. 
3 We are aware of the fact that scientific activities are also investigated by STS scholars and by 
sociologists of science. However, it is mainly in philosophy of science where such activities are 
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Note that while we argue that ELSI research will benefit from taking results 
from the philosophy of science on board and, more specifically, that ELSI research must 
encompass the systematic investigation of epistemic issues, this does not imply that 
philosophy of science must provide final answers to epistemic questions to be of use for 
ELSI research.4 As is the case for all subdisciplines of philosophy, including ethics, 
philosophy of science almost never provides final answers to issues under consideration 
and issues tend to remain susceptible to multiple viewpoints. What philosophy of 
science provides are possible answers, positions, perspectives, and so on regarding 
questions under consideration, thus providing a spectrum of possible ways of addressing 
questions. While debates in the philosophy of science occasionally do yield a dominant 
answer to a question (for example regarding the tenability of a traditional essentialist 
conceptualization of biological species, where the majority view is that such a 
conceptualization does not fit contemporary biology), in most cases no such majority 
view is achieved. 
But philosophers of science often do much more than merely raise questions: 
they systematically map out the spectrum of possible positions regarding the questions 
they raise and highlight problems with each of these possibilities. That is, philosophy of 
science provides a spectrum of possible answers to a specific question along with an 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these answers, on which other areas of work 
can build. For ELSI research, the clear benefit of such philosophical results lies in the 
achievement of a more solid basis for normative assessments: ELSI researchers can 
                                               
considered from an ontological, epistemological and/or methodological (i.e. partly normative) 
standpoint. 
4 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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formulate normative claims under the explicit assumption of a particular position in the 
spectrum as mapped by philosophers of science. This allows ELSI researchers to 
formulate sets of normative claims, each under the assumption of a particular epistemic 
claim, and in this way to map out the normative spectrum in a systematic and perhaps 
even exhaustive way. Because final answers to epistemic questions are virtually 
impossible to achieve, framing normative claims under the explicit assumption of a 
particular answer to an epistemic issue is the best that can be achieved. But this is not a 
fundamental problem, as moral philosophy cannot typically provide final answers to 
moral issues either, such that ELSI research would not be able to provide final 
normative claims anyway. It thus is clear that ELSI research will benefit from the 
integration of work in the philosophy of science without requiring philosophy of science 
to provide final answers to epistemic questions. 
In the remainder of the paper, we will defend our claims by taking ELSI 
research as an example and arguing for the potential of what we call integrated E2LSI 
research for addressing normative questions related to the life sciences – i.e., we argue 
for the potential of ELSI research conducted in an integrative manner with research on 
the epistemic aspects of the relevant area of science (see the concluding section for 
discussion). We will proceed as follows. In section 2 we will highlight key aspects 
regarding the current division of labor between ELSI research and philosophy of 
science that are relevant for our discussion. In section 3 we will make some 
qualifications regarding the strength and the scope of our main claims, and illustrate and 
support our main claims by providing three examples (or “mini case studies”) from 
different areas of the life sciences and related normative issues – namely genome 
editing in plants, animal experimentation, and chimera research. We will end with a 
programmatic outlook in section 4. 
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2. The division of labor in ELSI research 
An important motivation behind our proposal is the existence of a divide between 
mainstream ELSI research on the one hand, and philosophy of science on the other. 
This divide manifests itself in distinct research agendas and discourses, as well as, in 
many cases, in institutional separation with philosophers of science working in 
philosophy departments and ELSI researchers often having positions in life sciences 
institutes, medical schools, or dedicated ELSI/bioethics institutes. We suggest that this 
institutional separation is a consequence of at least three factors. 
First, ELSI research has its roots in bioethics, which, although multidisciplinary 
from the start, was dominated by ethicists and moral theologians due to a “triggering” 
by moral questions5 and scandals6 in the 1950s/60s (Jonsen 2004; Kerasidou and Parker 
2014). This shaped the landscape of later discussions and lead to the identification of 
“philosophical analysis” with “ethical analysis” in research on the normative questions 
in the life sciences. Second, institutional inertia and path dependencies are amplifying 
this tendency to the present day through, among other things, the anchoring of 
traditional bioethics components in undergraduate education in the biological and 
biomedical sciences (Willmott et al. 2004) and of dedicated ELSI modules in 
                                               
5 E.g. questions revolving around organ donation and end-of-life decisions as a consequence of 
the invention of the heart-lung-machine in the 1950s. 
6 E.g. the unethical cancer experiments at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital of Brooklyn in 
the 1960s (Arras 2008; Lerner 2004; Preminger 2002) and the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study 
from 1932-1972 (https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm).  
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prestigious graduate programs in the life sciences.7 Philosophy of science does not have 
a comparable status in undergraduate and graduate programs in the sciences, and is 
hardly ever (if at all) included in the bioethics or ELSI courses offered to scientists. In 
addition, philosophers of science typically are not part of the target group of initiatives 
and funding programs that focus on the normative assessment of controversial life 
science research and biotechnology development, and have more traditional ELSI topics 
in view.8 Third, for a long time there seems to have been a widespread aversion on the 
part of (theoretical) philosophers of science to embark too much on the “socio-ethical 
side of things”.9 This is a consequence of a mix of political and economic factors that 
for a long time promoted a value-free philosophy of science in line with Hans 
Reichenbach’s ideal in the 20th century (Reisch 2005; Vaesen and Katzav 2019) – an 
ideal that only recently came under criticism within mainstream philosophy of science 
(e.g. Fehr and Plaisance 2010; Weaver 2019). 
There are, of course, examples where research on the ethical/social aspects of 
scientific research and its epistemic dimension have been integrated to some degree, e.g. 
                                               
7 E.g. at the University of Oxford (http://www.dtc.ox.ac.uk/courses-and-
network/academic-modules.html, accessed May 14, 2019. 
8 Such as the NIH’s Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) of Genomics 
Research Project Grant Program (https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/pa-17-
444.html), Genome Canada’s GE3LS program, or the (terminated) joint German-
Austrian-Finnish ELSA-GEN initiative. 
9 This has changed, but this change only happened during the past decade. Today the 
topic “science and values” occupies a prominent position in the philosophy of science 
(e.g. Kitcher 2011; 2003; Douglas 2000; Elliott 2017). Many of the more traditional 
ethical aspects of research in the life sciences (such as our moral responsibility towards 
laboratory animals), however, are still not on the agenda of mainstream philosophy of 
science. 
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in philosophical work on evidence-based medicine (Worrall 2008) and in discussions 
revolving around the meaning and social implications of genetics (Sarkar 1998). Such 
efforts at integration, however, often are initiated by philosophers of science who 
extend their work to address ethical, societal and practical issues. The field of 
philosophy of medicine that has emerged recently and currently is rapidly expanding is 
a good example of such integrative work initiated by philosophers of science (e.g. 
Broadbent 2013; Stegenga 2018; Valles 2018). Integration is not typically initiated from 
the side of ELSI research, though, such that more often than not contemporary ELSI 
research and philosophy of science are quite detached from each other, thereby 
depriving the normative analysis of the life sciences and biotechnology of important 
resources. The examples we provide in the next section should serve as motivation to 
change this situation and foster integrating philosophy of science into ELSI research. 
 
3. Three examples 
Before we proceed to our examples, we will explain the function of the selected cases 
for our argument. In recent years there has been a surge of papers on the use of 
examples and cases in philosophy of science (e.g. Pitt 2001; Burian 2001; Chang 2011; 
Currie 2015; Kinzel 2015; Pietsch 2016). Philosophers and historians of science have 
highlighted various epistemic roles that case studies can play in philosophy (and 
history) of science, such as providing counterexamples to philosophical theories, 
function as heuristic devices for research, or providing evidence for inductive 
generalizations about science (with the latter being criticised heavily from a 
methodological point of view, see Kinzel 2015). 
In this paper we broadly follow Currie’s (2015) idea of using cases as “illustrating 
conceptual tools”. This means that we are not aiming for inductive generalizations 
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based on the examples used. The main idea is to use the discussed cases to show how in 
concrete terms – and without relying on toy examples – philosophy of science can make 
important contributions to the normative analysis of the life sciences and in what way 
ethical, legal and social issues in the life sciences may depend on epistemic aspects or 
have an important epistemic dimension. Each of the three cases will be used to illustrate 
a different way in which philosophy of science can contribute. That way, the case 
studies can serve as paradigms for successful integrated research, showing its heuristic 
potential and acting as inspiring models for other cases. In Currie’s words, cases are 
used here “to both illustrate how the machinery operates and demonstrate its potential” 
(Currie 2015, p. 566).  
The first case (on genome editing) shows how the clarification of scientific 
concepts including their historical dimension can have normative bearing for the 
regulation of new biotechnologies. The second case (on animal experimentation) 
illustrates how a (socio-)epistemological analysis of scientific practice can help to 
identify latent normative issues and ethico-epistemic trade-offs that should be assed 
from an integrated point of view. The third case (on chimera research) is based on a 
best-practice example and shows how a philosophically informed description of the 
actual scientific image of the world – as opposed to scientific myth or an overly 
superficial view of what science tells us about the world – can help to debunk 
misguided ethical arguments and redirected our normative analysis in a fruitful way. 
We should also make two important qualifications regarding our methodology, 
and the scope and strength of our main claim. (1) The primary function of the following 
“mini cases studies” is to substantiate our main argument. Therefore, we will not 
provide (too) many details but treat the cases mainly as paradigmatic examples – i.e., 
we are not aiming to provide full-blown case studies. (2) We do not claim that each and 
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every ELSI project needs to integrate philosophy of science into its research. Our claim, 
in other words, is compatible with the existence of normative issues in the life sciences 
that can be addressed adequately within the standard ELSI framework. But we do want 
to claim that often integrating philosophy of science into ELSI projects is crucial, and 
that it is always a good idea for ELSI researchers to explore whether current philosophy 
of science should play an active role in their work. 
 
3.1. Case I: Regulatory classification of genome editing 
Genome editing is a general term for a series of techniques that allow precise alteration 
of the genetic material of a cell (somatic or germline), the most prominent being the 
molecular “scissors” CRISPR-Cas9. The technique can be applied without leaving any 
residual transgenic sequence in the target genome, only introducing a point mutation. 
Besides various somatic applications genome editing can be used to introduce 
alterations to the human germline (Howard et al. 2018) or to breed plants and animals 
(Hartung and Schiemann 2014; Van Eenennaam 2017) with unprecedented ease. 
Therefore, genome editing has recently received much public attention and has 
reinvigorated traditional ELSI discussions on genetic engineering and genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). 
There is a wide variety of new and emerging research on ethical, legal and social 
issues regarding genome editing as well as a long and entrenched debate about genetic 
engineering dating back to the 1970s (Berg et al. 1975). Most attention has been 
devoted to ethical, legal and social implications of human germ line editing – even more 
so recently, as news of a first successfully gene edited human baby provoked a global 
outcry (Cyranoski and Ledford 2018; Lovell-Badge 2019). Agricultural GMOs also 
have long been at the focus of public scrutiny and engagement for setting boundaries to 
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applications of genetic engineering, and this topic has been strongly debated in recent 
years (Braun and Dabrock 2018; Kemper 2011) – even though the debate has been 
slightly less heated than in the case of human germline applications. 
Debates on genetic engineering traditionally revolve around three broader 
issues: First, there is a debate rooted mainly in deontological ethics on the transgression 
of natural boundaries, involving considerations of human nature and dignity, or 
theological arguments and “playing god” (e.g. Comstock, 2014; Dabrock, 2009; De 
Vries, 2006; Menacher, 2012; Robert and Baylis, 2003).10 Second, there is a very broad 
and interdisciplinary debate around precaution and risks emanating from genetic 
engineering, that focuses on the question of public participation and ideal political 
deliberation (e.g. Thompson 2018; Stirling, Hayes, and Delborne 2018; adding 
consumer choice issues to the list, see Bechtold 2018) as well as particular ethical or 
legal discussions on the justification and scope of the precautionary principle (Bogner 
and Torgersen 2018; Braun and Dabrock 2018; Dürnberger, Pfeilmeier, and Schleissing 
2019). Third, there is a debate on social and ethical issues of distributive justice in 
societies that for example engage in unequal human enhancement (e.g. Buchanan and 
Brock 2007), or in an agrarian economy involving GMOs (e.g. Toft 2012; or as 
socioeconomic example Wesseler and Zilberman 2014). A much discussed topic at the 
fringes of distributive justice are legal and ethical issues regarding biopatents (Ossorio 
2008; Storz 2018; Tvedt and Forsberg 2017). While traditional ELSI research focuses 
on analyzing issues from within the frame of its traditionally constitutive (thus focusing 
on topics such as distributive justice, democratic participation, inherent dignity, etc.), 
                                               
10 The case of chimera research discussed below (3.3) involves similar considerations on the 
transgression of natural species boundaries. 
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the case presented here tackles issues starting from scientific classificatory practice – a 
longstanding topic of discussion in philosophy of science.  
In regulatory contexts the debate focuses on the legal status of organisms altered 
by genome editing, as well as on the questions whether it is scientifically accurate to 
classify genome editing techniques as a category of mutagenesis techniques, and 
whether (some) genome edited organisms should count as GMOs (Sprink et al. 2016). 
The European GMO-Directive (2001/18/EC) regulates the deliberate release of GMOs, 
such as genetically modified crops in agriculture, but prominently excludes organisms 
produced by mutagenesis from its scope of application (Art. 3 i.c.w. Annex IA). If the 
concept of mutagenesis is interpreted as including genome editing techniques (which is 
possible, as such techniques only induce point mutations), these would be excluded 
from the regulatory scope of European GMO law (which governs labelling, monitoring, 
environmental and toxicology assessments, liability, etc.). The question thus has far-
reaching implications for what is planted on our fields and served on our plates.  
An example may serve to clarify this. Along with many other seedless crops, our 
typical supermarket banana (e.g. the ‘Grand Nain’ Cavendish cultivar or, more 
colloquially, Chiquita-style banana) is a clonally reproduced variety. Each banana tree 
is genetically almost identical to the next and the artificial induction of mutations has 
been the only productive way of increasing variability for better pathogen resistance 
(Oladosu et al. 2016). This has been done in the past decades with a variety of 
techniques of mutagenesis, such as exposing whole organisms to a radioactive source to 
induce random mutations up to more recent techniques using in-vitro cell culture and 
molecular markers. None of the resulting cultivars has been commonly viewed as a 
GMO by the consumer. In the past few years however, genome editing has come up as a 
new technology for introducing mutations, in particular to confer resistance for the 
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Cavendish banana against new threatening plant pests (Tripathi et al. 2020). But are the 
new cultivars obtained by genome editing to be considered GMOs, as they are created 
by means of a molecular technology? Would they have to be considered GMOs even if 
they were to carry only mutations which also could have been obtained by conventional 
means? 
In the relevant legal commentaries, the term “mutagenesis” appears to refer to a 
technical concept with a clear-cut definition. However, the term is neither legally 
defined nor further delimited anywhere else in European GMO law. In such a case, 
interpretation (of a term that is not defined within the relevant legal body) should be 
based on its common meaning (Beck 2019; Wasmer and Robienski 2018). For scientific 
concepts arguably the common meaning is the technical meaning of the concept as used 
in the relevant area of science. In sum, the epistemological as well as ontological 
question here concerns the clarification of the concept of mutagenesis for legal appraisal 
and discussion. 
However, there is no standardized solution to determining the meaning of 
technical concepts in the sciences – and this constitutes a deeper problem for 
biotechnology law. On the one hand, the interpretation of terms that are not further 
defined within the law requires formal definitions or at least contextual information that 
allows a clear-cut delimitation of the meaning of relevant terms. On the other hand, in 
the practices of in the life sciences many terms are used without being sharply defined 
and with their meanings evolving over time (prominent examples are concepts such as 
‘gene’, ‘species’, ‘function’ and so on – see, e.g. Wieben 2003; Reydon 2004; Stotz and 
Griffiths 2004; Griffiths and Stotz 2006; Reydon and Kunz 2019). This simple insight – 
that terms in the life sciences are seldom sharply defined and change as science 
progresses – has been a longstanding topic of study in (integrated) history and 
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philosophy of science, and is an important insight for drafting of future biotechnology 
law. 
For the case of mutagenesis it quickly becomes clear that no formal definition is 
available. An extensive survey of relevant dictionaries of biology and genetics as well 
as a keyword search for relevant publications using the term ‘mutagenesis’ as a 
technical term reveals considerable variation of use across disciplines (e.g. between 
plant genetics and oncology) and across time. For example, in the 1970s the term was 
used only to designate natural processes of mutation. In the 1990s (at the time of 
drafting the European Directive) the term was used often as a technical term in genetic 
engineering, while nowadays it is used exclusively in this context. A contribution to the 
legal discussion (Wasmer and Robienski 2018) pointed to variations in the use of the 
term and proposed a dynamic interpretation of the term “mutagenesis”, using the 
extension of the concept in current literature on agricultural breeding techniques, as a 
solution to determining the relevant meaning of the concept for legal discussion. 
It is worth noting that each approach to defining the meaning of ‘mutagenesis’ 
for the case at hand depends on a choice that involves weighing different epistemic and 
non-epistemic values. For instance, basing the interpretation of the term on the most 
current scientific literature may be motivated by the desire for inclusion of the newest 
available scientific knowledge and weighing it above cautionary concerns regarding 
safety of new technologies. A precautionary stance, on the other hand, may justify 
choosing a historical interpretation of the term set at the time of the drafting of the 
GMO-Directive. The latter excludes the newest techniques already by definition, 
whereas the former values scientific and societal change over the original will of the 
legislator. Hence, even a conscious and well-informed interpretation of the term 
‘mutagenesis’ will entail value-based choices, which ideally should be made transparent 
This is the authors' final version. The article has been accepted for publication in Perspectives on Science.
 
18 
when scientific expertise is employed for legal interpretation. Making such value-based 
choices transparent in the context of the clarification of scientific terms is a job par 
excellence for philosophers of science in the context of integrated ELSI projects. 
After a lengthy debate among opinionated legal commentators the European 
Court of Justice (CJEU 2018) ruled that the mutagenesis exemption only applies to 
techniques of mutagenesis that were considered to have a long safety record prior to 
instatement of the law in 2001 (Beck 2019; Wasmer 2019). Thereby the court ended the 
discussion about the exemption of all new techniques of directed mutagenesis such as 
CRISPR-Cas9. However, it inadvertently made the quest for the meaning of the concept 
of mutagenesis additionally a question of history of science (Wasmer 2019) such that an 
appropriate conceptual clarification now also must involve a historical component. 
This case study shows how (integrated) history and philosophy of science can 
develop normative bearing in the context of underdetermined legal terms. Beyond 
simply defining a term as part of a scientific ontology, further questions of a more 
normative nature become relevant in the case of clarifying a concept for legal appraisal 
and discussion: Who has the prerogative of interpretation of such terms? Is there a 
consensus on the scientific definitions of the concepts involved? How stable are the 
scientific concepts in time and across different contexts? Where do legal definitions 
diverge from a common meaning of the concepts and where do misunderstandings arise 
in making reference to scientific concepts in legal (and ethical) debate? 
These are important epistemological and ontological issues in the discussion of 
ethical and legal aspects with relevance for the interpretation and drafting of 
biotechnology regulation. Philosophy of science brings an additional skillset to such 
work in biotechnology regulation that is an essential addition to the methods of either 
biology or law. The reason for this is that legal methods alone do not suffice to identify 
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the meaning of “mutagenesis”, precisely because the question emanates from 
underdetermination of the legal meaning. Methods from the natural sciences alone do 
not suffice either, because the meanings of scientific terms are not primarily empirical 
issues but rather issues involving theoretical, normative and historical aspects. 
Philosophers of science have long been engaged in the reflection on such issues. 
Philosophy of science will equally be helpful in other cases in which legal 
interpretation depends on epistemological or ontological questions. This may be the 
case when laws have to be drafted in a way that permits admitting for future scientific 
developments, or when terms are unclear or contested in science. Examples include 
taxonomic definitions and judgments based thereupon (Garnett and Christidis 2017) and 
the definition of ecological parameters such as biodiversity (Garson, Plutynski, and 
Sarkar 2016). 
 
3.2. Case II: Animal experimentation and the 3R principle 
Our second case concerns the practice of animal experimentation and the so called “3R 
principle”. Tens of millions of vertebrate animals are used for scientific purposes all 
over the world per year (Taylor et al., 2008).11 Animals are used in basic research, 
applied research, drug development, safety testing and for many other scientific 
purposes. There is a strong consensus in the life sciences and science policy and among 
the general public that these numbers are much too high and we need to improve 
scientific research and safety testing to reduce animal suffering. This should be done 
                                               
11According to the latest official numbers on animal experimentation by the EU 
commission, in 2017 there were 9.39 Mio. vertebrates and cephalopods used for 
scientific and regulatory purposes in the EU alone (European Commission 2020). 
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according to the influential 3R principle introduced by Russel and Burch (1959). The 
principle states that we should attempt to replace animal experiments with alternative 
methods (or “non-animal-methods”), reduce the numbers of animals that we use for a 
specific scientific purpose (“more information per animal”), and refine animal 
experiments to improve animal welfare and to make animals suffer as little as possible. 
There are many long-lasting normative discussions revolving around the 3R 
principle and animal experimentation more broadly. One of the key questions concerns 
the legitimacy of (certain forms of) animal experimentation. Today’s mainstream 
position is that animal experimentation is morally defensible if and only if (1) the 
benefits (e.g. biomedical knowledge, new biotechnologies, product safety) outweigh the 
harms done to the animals and (2) there is no valid alternative to animal 
experimentation for the scientific purpose. Naturally, there remain many unresolved 
questions within the mainstream position, such as whether we should define some kind 
of upper limit for animal suffering (Beauchamp and Morton 2015), and how we should 
approach the difficult task of a rational harm-benefit-analysis given that this involves 
comparing incommensurable goods (Arnason and Clausen 2016; Grimm, Olsson, and 
Sandøe 2018). These unresolved ethical questions also arise in the regulation of animal 
experimentation, where they appear as inconsistencies regarding upper limits for animal 
suffering and vague guidelines for the analysis of harms and benefits (Beauchamp and 
Morton 2015; Smith et al. 2018). The regulatory context of animal experimentation and 
best ways to implement the 3R principle using legal tools are, therefore, much debated 
topics in ELSI research. Next to the ethical, legal and governance questions, there is a 
line of sociological ELSI research that investigates, among other things, assessments of 
the practicability of the 3R principle by scientists (Franco, Sandøe, and Olsson 2018), 
and the influence of animal rights activism on science policy and legislation (Munro 
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2012). These issues are important in their own right and the respective discussions have 
been essential for advancing the implementation of the 3R principle. We believe, 
however, that there a number of important, albeit hidden, epistemic aspects missing 
from the picture and want to draw attention to socio-epistemic aspects of the status quo 
that have been neglected but have normative relevance for the 3R discussion and the 
regulation of animal experimentation and non-animal-methods. In our view, these 
aspects can best be reconstructed and analyzed through the lens of philosophy of 
science. 
The implementation of the 3R principle in science policy and (self-)regulation 
has, in conjunction with scientific and technological progress, in the last two decades 
generated many new ways to replace animal experimentation with non-animal-methods. 
Prominent examples include in vitro systems for assessing adverse effects of drugs, 
disease models based on human embryonic stem cells, organ(s)-on-a-chip-systems and 
sophisticated “read-across”-computer algorithms to predict toxicological properties of 
unknown chemical substances (see Butzke et al. 2013; Polini et al. 2014 for an 
overview). Despite these developments non-animal-methods have not led to an 
extensive replacement of animal experimentation. Some of the inhibiting factors put 
forward in the scientific literature are a lack of awareness and expertise regarding new 
non-animal-methods in the scientific community, intrinsic limitations of non-animal-
approaches for some research purposes and an inadequate funding infrastructure for the 
development of a more comprehensive array of alternative methods (Gruber and 
Hartung, 2004; Meigs et al., 2018). Another reason that is highlighted in regard to basic 
and translational research is a high degree of “scientific inertia”: there seems to be a 
relatively low level of active engagement of the scientific research communities in the 
development and use of alternative methods (Cronin 2017). Two standard accounts 
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attempt to explain this state of affairs: (1) Scientists who are active in the non-animal-
research community and/or are known to be sceptics with regard to the current animal 
research regime tend to explain the relative lack of engagement with dogmatic attitudes 
of animal researchers and “scientific resistance” to new methods (Gruber and Hartung 
2004; Knight 2011: pp. 98f). (2) Scientists who regularly use animals in their research, 
on the other hand, are more likely to make the case that the observed scientific inertia is 
best explained by the indispensability of animal experiments for scientific progress. 
Non-animal-methods, they argue, are just not as developed as their proponents like to 
believe and, hence, cannot replace many kinds of animal experiments (yet) (e.g. Barré-
Sinoussi and Montagutelli 2015). 
It matters for the normative assessment of the status quo who is right here (and 
to what extent). However, it is not obvious which side to pick, which is why ELSI 
researchers cannot – or rather: should not – take any side for granted in their research. 
In this situation, a philosophy of science perspective will be extremely helpful in 
providing an independent and critical analysis of the situation. Such an analysis would 
take scientific practice and its epistemic aspects seriously without taking the self-
assessments of scientists at face value. There are two (socio-)epistemic aspects of 
animal-based research that seem to be particularly important if one is to shed some new 
light on the issue in question, namely (a) secondary epistemic functions of animal 
models, and (b) the socio-epistemic logic of risk management in the life sciences. In the 
following, we will focus on these aspects to indicate in what way philosophy of science 
can be illuminating for the 3R discussion.   
Animal models serve a number of epistemic purposes in the life sciences (Weber 
2014; 2018), including exploratory research, developing and testing hypotheses about 
biological mechanisms, animal-to-human extrapolations and many other things. Recent 
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research in philosophy of science has, however, highlighted a number of purposes or 
functions of animal models that seem be somewhat different (Ankeny and Leonelli 
2016; Hardesty 2018; Levy and Currie 2015). Animal models also have what we call 
secondary epistemic functions for life science research communities.12 Here are three 
examples. 
(1) Animal models can have a paradigm-like function for research communities. 
Certain mouse models, for instance, are often used to study cancer immunotherapy. In a 
common procedure, immunodeficient mice get engrafted with human tumor tissue to 
study the effects of different kinds of treatment. This general procedure can serve as a 
blueprint for similar research projects. Researchers can use different immunodeficient 
mouse strains, or mouse models with humanized immune systems, or humanized mice 
with individualized immune properties; they can experiment with different kinds of 
tumor tissue, try different forms of immunotherapy and so on (see Choi et al. 2018 for 
an overview). The upshot of this is that specific animal models and standard research 
procedures applied to them provide research puzzles to solve and, at the same time, 
offer implicit guidance on how to solve these. Animal models can, in other words, be 
important in defining the problem space and a corresponding research perspective in an 
area of research. 
(2) A closely related function of animal models is that they are important in 
establishing shared techniques/methods and standards in various sub-disciplines. There 
are, for instance, standard protocols for antibody production in rats or mice (e.g. Kishiro 
et al., 1995). And animal models can display certain characteristics that may serve as a 
                                               
12 Strictly speaking it the use of animal models as key elements in “repertoire-like 
systems of scientific practice” that manifests these functions (see Lohse 2020 for a more 
detailed analysis). 
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benchmark for scientific success, e.g. a phenotypic response by mice or rats in reaction 
to a new drug is often considered important in biomedical research (Huber and Keuck 
2013). 
(3) Finally, animal models and their surrounding infrastructure can function as 
anchors and stabilizers for research communities on a more institutional level. First of 
all, research communities tend to align themselves with certain animal models (Lewis et 
al. 2013). Moreover, there exist animal-based communication and knowledge hubs for 
researchers (such as the Mouse Models of Human Cancer Database, 
http://tumor.informatics.jax.org/mtbwi/index.do), which provide a digital infrastructure 
for sharing knowledge on an international level. Professionalized providers for 
standardized, high quality animal strains (such as Jax Mice & Services, 
https://www.jax.org/jax-mice-and-services) and companies that specialize on the 
creation of transgenic animals (such as PolyGene Transgenics, 
https://www.polygene.ch) have an additional stabilizing effect on research communities 
via the robust deployment of standardized resources for experimental work.13  
These secondary epistemic functions of animal models contribute to the 
establishment of a joint research perspective/agenda, stabilize research communities in 
the life sciences and promote scientific progress. At the same time, their working 
together generates scientific and infrastructural path dependencies and is likely to 
convey a strong sense of indispensability of animal experimentation in the relevant 
scientific research communities. 
Scientific progress is always uncertain, though, and in many cases it is unclear 
whether a new and promising line of research or method will turn out to be more 
                                               
13 See Ankeny & Leonelli (2011) for the case of model organisms.  
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successful in dealing with a persistent scientific obstacle than established lines of 
research and methods. An important epistemic reason for this is that new and promising 
approaches can always fail and that traditional approaches can always turn out to be 
flexible (or “upgradable”) enough to overcome given scientific problems. Kuhn (1977) 
and D’Agostino (2010) have shown that scientific communities address this dilemma by 
using a “risk-spreading strategy”. In light of persistent obstacles in research some 
researchers try to modify existing approaches (“the traditionalists”) while others attempt 
to develop or apply new, alternative approaches to the problem (“the iconoclasts”). 
Although only one of the approaches might be successful in dealing with a given 
scientific problem and the others might fail, the scientific community as a whole is more 
likely to be successful this way.14 In our context, the traditionalists’ approach is based 
on animal experimentation, so it is important to note that the epistemic usefulness of 
animal models in experimental settings is not fixed. If anything, their epistemic 
flexibility seems to be quite high. First of all, animal models, although standardized 
organisms, are extremely complex natural systems to be explored; i.e. animal models 
can in many cases act as “generators of surprises” in that they yield new and unexpected 
properties (after scientists have had (more) time to interact with them and to tinker with 
the experimental systems of which they are an element) (Rheinberger 1997; Weber 
2014). Secondly, the scientific questions that can be investigated using animal 
experimentation very much depend on the available technologies and tools in the life 
sciences and, hence, are also not fixed. Examples for “disruptive technologies” that 
opened up new epistemic opportunities include new imaging technologies (such as 
                                               
14 This description is not completely in line with Kuhn’s and D’Agostino’s ideas  (see 
Hoyningen-Huene and Lohse 2011), but it is very much inspired by them.  
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fMRT) and gene-editing technologies (such as CRISPR-Cas9) that can be used to 
create, amongst others, fluorescent zebrafish for in-vivo tracking or mice with 
humanized immunological properties for biomedical research. 
The risk-spreading strategy seems to give life scientists very good 
epistemological and methodological reasons for pursuing the traditionalist animal-based 
approach next to (new and promising) non-animal-approaches. What is more, the 
epistemic flexibility of animal models seems to incentivize holding onto traditional 
forms of animal experimentation to a special degree. From a purely epistemological 
point of view, it would be risky to discontinue animal experimentation as it has in many 
cases turned out to be a highly adaptable research approach. 
This sketch of (socio-)epistemic aspects of animal-based research offers a 
fruitful perspective on the status quo of animal experimentation. It provides an 
illuminating explanation of the relative low level of engagement of the scientific 
community in the development and use of non-animal-methods. This explanation, 
though in need of further elaboration, is rooted in widely-accepted insights from (a 
historically informed) philosophy of science. It helps to uncover scientific inertia as a 
consequence of the general logic of life science research, and it makes the above-
mentioned opposing impressions of “scientific resistance” vs. “indispensability of 
animal research” appear in a new light: There are good reasons for sticking to a 
traditional research approach in an attempt to modify or upgrade it, although this can 
(from the outside), appear to be nothing more than dogmatism; and working within the 
current animal research regime (and being subjected to the described research-
stabilizing secondary epistemic functions) can lead scientists to the impression that 
animal models are indispensable, not only within current practice, but for doing life 
science research per se. 
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Our account immediately suggests a number of normative questions regarding 
the 3R principle, the (self-)regulation of science and related issues: If we want to 
accelerate the replacement of animal experimentation in basic and applied science, how 
can we do justice to the epistemic complexity of the situation, and which stakeholders 
need to be on board for systemic change? To what extent would a stricter regulation of 
animal experimentation (as, e.g. in the Netherlands) need to take the risk-spreading 
strategy in science into account? How should a rational science policy regarding animal 
experimentation deal with trade-offs between epistemic values and ethical demands? 
Addressing questions like these is important for a well-informed discussion of 
opportunities and limitations of animal experimentation, and it is crucial for a more 
efficient regulation of animal experimentation. It is the integration of philosophy of 
science into ELSI and related research that enables us to identify and to address these 
issues in an appropriate manner – a manner that is sensitive to the (socio-)epistemic 
details and to the normative implications of animal-based research. 
 
3.3. Case III: chimera research 
Our third case concerns the creation of chimeric organisms. As living beings that 
incorporate genetic or bodily material from multiple species, chimeras are widely met 
with discomfort or even outright rejection. Much of this discomfort is due to lack of 
clarity regarding the question what chimeric beings really are, that is, to which groups 
in the whole realm of biodiversity they in fact belong. For example, are human-animal 
chimeric embryos a kind of human embryos, or non-human animal embryos, or a 
category sui generis? And if they are human embryos, should we treat them as fully 
human embryos, enjoying the same rights and the same protection as regular human 
embryos, or does their partially non-human nature give them lower degrees of 
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protection and fewer rights? Both ethically and legally, such questions are important – 
and they result from questions regarding the classification or chimeric beings. 
Another often heard argument, in particular in earlier debates, is that the 
production of chimeras is ethically problematic because is consists in the transgression 
of presumed natural boundaries between species and in violations of the natural 
integrity of species. That is, the boundaries between species, in particular between the 
human species and other animals, are “given” by nature and disrupting the natural order 
by technological means is something we aren’t allowed to do. Such ways of arguing are 
found for example with authors who argue in a religious context, authors who argue on 
the basis of human dignity, and as a “gut feeling” with the general public (for a recent 
review of the literature, see Kwisda et al., 2020; furthermore: Hübner 2018; Mirkes 
2006; Schaub 2006; Robert and Baylis 2003; Streiffer 2003; Comstock 1998). In such a 
way of arguing, too, ethical, legal and social issues arise due to classificatory issues – 
albeit that here it is no lack of clarity about the classification of chimeric beings, but 
rather assumptions about there being fixed boundaries between species.  
Both kinds of argumentation rest on the assumption that biodiversity comes in 
fixed, well-delimited groups – that there is a natural order in the living world. The 
assumption is that species exist as groupings of organisms that are “given” by nature, 
that have fixed boundaries that are not transgressed in nature (but might be transgressed 
by us using particular technologies) and that every organism has its proper place in 
nature as a member of one species. An open question, though, is whether such an 
assumption should indeed give rise to the aforementioned ethical concerns, and in what 
way it could legitimately give rise to ethical concerns at all. 
 Here we highlight research that answers this question and can be seen as a “best 
practice” example of the sort of integrated research that we suggest should be done 
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more generally, namely Robert & Baylis’s (2003) widely cited paper on the topic and 
extensions of Robert and Baylis’s work by other authors. We also show how this work 
can be extended further. 
Robert and Baylis suggested that four main categories of the production of 
chimeras can be distinguished: human-to-animal chimeras (created by e.g. inserting 
human cellular material into non-human animal embryos), animal-to-human chimeras 
(in which the authors notably include human recipients of animal organs by means of 
xenotransplantation), human-to-human chimeras (where the authors include recipients 
of conventional organ transplants as well as recipients of stem cells from other humans 
in stem cell therapy), and animal-to-animal chimeras.15 This fourfold categorization of 
chimeras provides us with a theoretical framework that allows a deeper analysis of  
ethical, legal and social issues than would have been possible when simply considering 
these issues tout court. 
Robert & Baylis’s categorization clearly highlights an easily overlooked issue in 
the debate: that the four overarching categories of chimeric organisms are perceived as 
problematic to different extents and for different reasons. The focus of ELSI debates so 
far has been on the acceptability of human-to-animal and animal-to-human chimeras 
(e.g. Mizuno, Akutsu, and Kato 2015; Hyun 2016). Human-to-human chimeras are 
widely perceived as unproblematic and any ethical issues involving human-to-human 
organ transplantation are discussed as an issue sui generis. That is, human-to-human 
chimeras are not typically seen as giving rise to ethical problems due to their nature as 
chimeric beings but ethical problems are seen as originating elsewhere (e.g., questions 
                                               
15 Next to these four categories of chimeras, Robert & Baylis distinguish hybrids and 
transgenic animals as additional categories of controversial living beings. Here, we will 
not consider these. 
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regarding fair allocation of organs intended for transplants; the question whether 
harvesting organs after death requires a declaration of consent from the individual, or 
the absence of a declaration of refusal would suffice; and so on). Most people would 
probably not even think of a human who has received an organ from someone else as an 
actual chimeric being at all (even though from a strictly scientific perspective they are). 
The category of chimeras is usually thought to encompass organisms created by transfer 
of material between organisms of different species, i.e., human-to-animal, animal-to-
human, and animal-to-animal (as long as two different animal species are involved). 
Robert and Baylis’s work thus shows that what lies behind ethical worries 
regarding the production of chimeras is connected to the species identities of the 
organisms involved in the making of chimeric beings. The problem is not so much that 
organisms carry (genetic or tissue) material that is not originally their own, but that they 
carry material that “belong” to different species. As Robert & Baylis (2003, p. 2) 
observe, the “the prevailing view appears to be that species identity is fixed and that 
species boundaries are inappropriate objects of human transgression.” But they go on to 
point out that such assumptions about fixed boundaries between species, and about 
species having intrinsic natures, are in conflict with the current (as well as older) state 
of knowledge in the biological sciences, such that these assumptions cannot in fact 
support the ethical concerns that often are thought to follow from them. 
Robert and Baylis, however, do not hold that the creation of chimeric beings 
should not give rise to any ethical concerns. Rather, they argue that that ethical debates 
on chimera research are driven by an “inexorable moral confusion” that results from 
profound lack of clarity regarding to how chimeric beings should be classified. The 
argument is that the introduction of moral categories (chimeras, the moral status of 
which is debated) that fail to connect to biological categories (species, the moral status 
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of which is presumed to be clear) causes deep confusion regarding how chimeras should 
be treated. Lacking stable reference groups that support moral categories, there is no 
way of determining whether the moral categories we use in the debate are well-founded. 
This point could only be made by making strong connections to the large literature on 
classificatory issues in the philosophy of biology and in biology itself – and in this 
sense Robert and Baylis’s article exemplifies how work in the philosophy of science can 
be crucial for assessing whether ethical concerns are well-founded.  
In what follows, we show how such an analysis of ethical concerns by using 
results from philosophy of science can be extended. Thinking of chimera research as 
transgressing naturally given species boundaries presupposes clarity on what biological 
species are and in what ways their boundaries might be given by nature. Historians and 
philosophers of biology (as well as philosophically inclined biologists) have long 
addressed these issues, with a result that calls such presuppositions of clarity into 
question. Currently, more than 20 definitions of the term “species” are available in the 
literature. These give different accounts of what species are, what makes individual 
organisms members of “their” species, and how the boundaries of species are delimited 
(Reydon and Kunz 2019; Ereshefsky 2014; Wilkins 2011; 2009; Mayden 1999; 1997). 
Different definitions sometimes lead to very different assessments of the number of 
species that exist in a particular geographic region or in a particular domain of 
biodiversity (Reydon and Kunz 2019; Reydon 2019; Agapow et al. 2004). In biological 
research practice, multiple definitions of the term “species” are used and we are very far 
removed from a general agreement on a preferred definition, or on the question what 
species really are. As already mentioned above, many concepts in the life sciences are 
not sharply defined and undergo profound changes in meaning as science progresses. 
The notion of species is one of the concepts that is perhaps the most problematic in this 
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respect. It is safe to say that the assumption that species boundaries are unequivocally 
given by nature stands on a very weak footing, as Haber and Benham (2012) have also 
pointed out. Rather, species boundaries should be seen as made by us – i.e., taxonomists 
are the ones who sort organisms into species – on the basis of various aspects of the 
living world that we intend species to represent (Reydon and Kunz 2019). Or, as 
Ankeny put it, “our working notion of fixed species boundaries is just that: a working 
model that allows biologists to get on with their work” (2003, p. 32). But then concerns 
about alleged transgressions of natural species boundaries do not make much sense. 
The same holds for presuppositions that species or their member organisms have 
an inherent nature that all members of the species share, and that is only shared by 
members of the species. Fox, for example, put it thus: “Genetic engineering makes it 
possible to breach the genetic boundaries that normally separate the genetic material of 
totally unrelated species. This means that the telos, or inherent nature, of animals can be 
so drastically modified […] as to radically change the entire direction of evolution” 
(1990, p. 32).16 On this assumption, creating chimeras from material from organisms of 
different species would amount to mixing the natures (or essences) of different species, 
thus somehow causing the evolutionary pathway of the species to go off its natural 
track. While genetic engineering of course does affect the future evolution of the 
population, the assumption that a species has an inherent nature that determines its 
natural course of evolution is mistaken. Moreover, what would such natures consist in? 
The assumption here seems to be that the inherent nature of a species consists in the 
genetic makeup that all a species’ member organisms share, but biological research has 
                                               
16 Fox’s claim pertains to genetic modification and genome editing, not to the creation 
of chimeric beings, but the discussion exhibit strong parallels and involve very similar 
conceptual issues. 
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long ago shown that this assumption is flawed: for all species there is a large genetic 
diversity among the organism of one species, while at the same time there are large 
genetic similarities between different species (with larger similarities between closely 
related species). In a response to Robert & Baylis’s paper, Haber & Benham (2012) 
address this issue. Haber & Benham deepen the conceptual analysis by showing that the 
assumed connection between moral and biological categories is highly problematic, as it 
rests on essentialist views of species that deeply conflict with the current state of 
biological knowledge (see Ereshefsky 2014, for an introduction to the literature on this 
matter). Thus, they strengthen Robert & Baylis’s analysis by adding still more 
considerations from the philosophy of biology. 
The preceding discussion shows how work from the history and philosophy of 
biology – in this case the historical and philosophical analysis of the scientific term 
“species” and of the foundations of biological classification – helps ELSI research as 
well as the public debate by providing insight into how well-founded (or not) particular 
concerns regarding specific technologies actually are. It shows how connecting the 
ELSI debate on chimeras with the long-standing debate in the philosophy of biology on 
the nature of species brings aspects of the debate to light that would have remained 
overlooked otherwise. The role of history and philosophy of biology in the chimera 
debate is to clean up misconceptions that have their roots in how we as human beings 
tend to perceive the world: as ordered into well-delimited kinds of things (kinds of 
chemical substances, kinds of rock, kinds of fruit, kinds of trees, kinds of animals, and 
so on) that all have something internal or innate to them that makes them into what they 
are. Philosophical analysis of classificatory concepts shows that the world is not as 
well-ordered as it often seems to be and that some of our commonplace assumptions 
about what the world is like are mistaken. Examining central assumptions behind our 
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concerns about certain technologies shows these concerns to be unfounded, but also 
shows how they arise in the first place (i.e., as a result of moral confusion). Such an 
analysis clears the way for a more subtle and more adequate examination of why the 
creation of chimeric beings could be problematic. 
One way in which integrated research could build on Robert & Baylis’s (2003) 
work is by refining the categories the authors use. The highlighting of humans and 
nonhuman animals as the two relata in the “transfer from … to …” relation in Robert & 
Baylis’s (2003) paper serves the authors’ purposes by reflecting widespread ethical 
worries: animal-to-animal chimeras could be problematic as they affect sentient beings 
that might suffer from the procedures they are subjected to or from being a chimeric 
being, while human-to-animal and animal-to-human chimeras could be problematic for 
those reasons and because they affect our species. But the framework can easily be 
extended to other parts of biodiversity: plants (where natural hybridization is common, 
and artificial hybridization in agriculture is common practice), fungi, and prokaryotes 
(where horizontal gene transfer between different species is not uncommon). Strictly 
speaking, for example, Bt-corn plants are chimeras (even though the amount of genetic 
material from Bacillus thuringiensis inserted into Zea mays is very low). 
Acknowledging that there are many more actual and potential categories of chimerism – 
e.g. prokaryote-to-plant chimeras, plant-to-plant chimeras, animal-to-plant chimeras, 
human-to-plant chimeras, prokaryote-to-human chimeras, prokaryote-to-prokaryote 
chimeras, etc. – will probably make it even more clear that ethical, legal and social 
concerns regarding chimera research are not linked to the creation of chimeric beings 
per se, as not all categories are equally perceived as problematic. Rather, they 
presumably are linked to more specific worries concerning technologies that affect our 
species, that affect sentient beings, that affect agriculture and the environment, etc. 
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Thus, an extended categorization should yield more subtle discussions of the actual 
concerns, such as harming sentient beings, harming the environment in which chimeric 
plants grow, potentially creating “super-bacteria” that we cannot keep under control 
once they have been realized, etc. 
An additional extension could also take into account the fact that not all animals 
are equally sentient beings or are equally capable of suffering: many animals are not 
sentient in any relevant sense at all. Pig-to-gorilla chimeras would in this respect give 
rise to very different concerns than flatworm-to-roundworm chimeras. In addition, it is 
worthwhile to highlight that chimeric beings also occur naturally (i.e., hybrid organisms 
such as mules), such that chimeric beings should not be ethically problematic merely 
because they are chimeras. Robert & Baylis’s framework, then, is an excellent first step 
towards a better, deeper and more subtle debate on the acceptability of chimera 
research, as it allows us to connect ethical, legal and social concerns to specific kinds of 
chimera production. The further development of their work must involve work in the 
(integrated) history and philosophy of biology (for instance on the question of animal 
sentience, or the way in which hybrid organisms are usually grouped in relation to their 
parent species). Thus, we suggest, the case of chimera research shows how history and 
philosophy of science played and must play a crucial part in achieving more clarity on 
the normative aspects of this area of research, and why these areas of the humanities 
should be an integral part of further ELSI research on this topic. 
 
4. Conclusion: From ELSI to E2LSI 
Let us re-evaluate our initial claims in light of the presented mini case studies. All three 
cases show that research on ethical, legal and social issues is concerned with 
fundamental normative questions that either are to a significant extent dependent on 
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epistemic issues or have a significant epistemic dimension. Therefore, these normative 
questions cannot be adequately addressed without in-depth clarification of the epistemic 
issues involved – which is the proper purview of philosophy of science. In case I the 
question of the legal status of genome-edited organisms is shown to crucially depend on 
epistemic considerations regarding the nature of scientific terms – specifically the term 
“mutagenesis” and its varied history and use. Case II illustrates how existing 
perspectives on ELS-issues of animal experimentation must be supplemented by 
completely new avenues of normative analysis for ELSI research based on an analysis 
of scientific practices involved in animal experimentation. Case III is a best-practice 
example in which the relevant epistemic issues were to some extent taken into account. 
This case shows how connecting an ELSI debate to relevant debates in the philosophy 
of biology helps to uncover certain concerns as unfounded, and it also shows how the 
available research can be extended into a more fine-grained conceptual structure with 
which the foundations of ongoing debates on chimera research can be assessed. Each of 
these cases thus shows ways in which ELSI research can benefit from (more) 
philosophy of science. 
Note, though, that even though we have only argued that ELSI research needs to 
incorporate the results from work done in the philosophy of science, we want to suggest 
that both sides will benefit from closer interaction. The philosophy of science will also 
benefit from closer connections with ELSI research in several ways. First, closer 
connections to ELSI research will likely open up new avenues for research in the 
philosophy of science by bringing new topics for investigation to the attention of 
philosophers of science. This will both increase the scope of topics that philosophers of 
science work on and increase the relevance of philosophy of science for other parts of 
academic scholarship. It will however also contribute to increasing the relevance of 
This is the authors' final version. The article has been accepted for publication in Perspectives on Science.
 
37 
philosophy of science as an academic (sub)discipline for areas outside academia. 
Recently, philosophers of science have begun to explore ways to make their field of 
work more socially relevant due to “a keen sense of missed opportunities for philosophy 
of science to have a broader social impact” (Fehr and Plaisance 2010, p. 301).17 This 
has resulted in institutionalized efforts to increase the social impact of scholarly work in 
the philosophy of science, such as SRPoiSE (the Consortium for Socially Relevant 
Philosophy of/in Science and Engineering – see http://srpoise.org), SEPOS (the Socially 
Engaged Philosophy of Science group at Michigan State University – see 
https://sepos.cal.msu.edu), and the E2LSI group (at Leibniz University Hannover’s 
Centre for Ethics and Law in the Life Sciences – see https://www.cells.uni-
hannover.de/e2lsi). Closer connections with ELSI research (which scholars in the 
aforementioned groups are already actively seeking to establish) will clearly further the 
aim of making philosophy of science more socially relevant. 
Because of these expected benefits for philosophy of science, but more 
importantly because philosophy of science is the go-to-discipline for understanding and 
reflecting on the (socio-)epistemic aspects of science, philosophy of science should be 
systematically and routinely integrated into ELSI (and related) research. One could for 
instance think of research programs that address Epistemic, Ethical, Legal and Social 
Issues in the life sciences in an integrated manner – that is, the systematic 
                                               
17 See also the special issue of Synthese on “Making Philosophy of Science More 
Socially Relevant” (Vol. 177, Issue 3, guest edited by Plaisance and Fehr), Cartieri and 
Potochnik (2014) or Elliott (2018). In the mentioned special issue, Tuana argued that 
philosophy of science can increase its social impact, highlighting the “contributions 
philosophers of science can make to an enriched understanding of the complexity of the 
ethical dimensions of scientific research, to policy-relevant science, and to epistemically 
and ethically adequate science based policy” Tuana (2010: pp. 489-490). 
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transformation of ELSI research into E2LSI research (from which topics for research as 
well as results would be fed back into philosophy of science more broadly). This 
demand does not only hold for the discussed examples but also for similar cases, i.e. for 
cases where the analysis and clarification of epistemic elements of scientific practice 
has the potential to reveal aspects with hidden normative dimensions or implications. 
While we have provided arguments for a transformation of ELSI into E2LSI 
research, we have not addressed the question how such a transformation could take 
place. We will conclude by briefly addressing this issue. Primarily, because of the 
differences between the involved areas of science, technologies and applications, and in 
the ELS-issues that arise with respect to the different technologies and applications, 
there can be no one-size-fits-all way of establishing an integrated E2LSI approach. The 
ELSI debate on, say, genome editing in plants, differs fundamentally from the debate 
on, for instance, the use of genomic testing in personalized medicine or by health 
insurance companies. The technologies are different in important respects, the 
biological knowledge base on which these are founded in part differs between cases, the 
applications are different, and therefore the ethical, legal and social issues under debate 
are different. When considering ELSI debates on highly divergent technologies, e.g. 
chimera research and nanotechnology, the differences in the issues that are addressed 
are even larger. Therefore, we are not suggesting that ethicists, theologians, social 
scientists, legal scholars, philosophers of science, historians of science, and so on, 
should join forces at a global level: we are not pleading for a merging of fields of 
research. What we are suggesting, rather, is a joining of forces by researchers from 
relevant fields at a local level – i.e.,  that the integration of relevant fields into E2LSI 
should take place on an issue-driven basis. 
This is the authors' final version. The article has been accepted for publication in Perspectives on Science.
 
39 
Starting with a specific debate, the broader community should first identify 
which areas of science and the humanities, and which aspects of these areas of research, 
are relevant to the issue under debate. This means that work on different ELS-issues 
calls for the participation of researchers working on different specialized topics in the 
philosophy of science, and research teams should be assembled on an ad hoc basis, 
bringing in expertise required for the issue under consideration. Note that philosophy of 
science is not special in this respect – the same holds for ethics, theology, social 
science, legal scholarship, and so on, as different issues require different expertise. 
Thus, what we are advocating is a view of E2LSI research in which scholars from 
relevant areas come together into integrated interdisciplinary research teams to work on 
specific issues, with different teams addressing different issues. We do not aim to 
provide overarching guidelines for how such teams should be established, however. Our 
proposal merely implies that researchers on the normative dimensions of science and 
technology should be deeply aware of the epistemic aspects of the topics they address 
and take time to reflect on potential contributions of pertinent fields (such as philosophy 
of genetics or philosophy of animal research). It will prove to be essential, in many 
cases, to integrate (relevant parts of) philosophy of science with ELSI research into 
interdisciplinary E2LSI projects18 in which the history and philosophy of science is 
positioned on an equal footing with the other fields of scholarship that participate in 
such projects. 
 
                                               
18 While we have only discussed ELSI research, educational aspects should also be taken into 
consideration, for example in the form of bespoke E2LSI modules in graduate programs, in 
postdoctoral training and in the continuing education of advanced scientists. 
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